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Abstract
This article evaluates the recently completed Base Erosion
and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project of the G20 and OECD and
offers some alternatives for reform.
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1 Introduction: The Financial
Crisis and Inequality
The financial crisis of 2008 and the Great Recession that
followed have raised anew the problem of how to
address a growing inequality both between the rich and
everybody else within countries, and between developed
and developing countries. Both dimensions of inequali-
ty, the intra- and inter-country ones, have risen in this
century, and the Great Recession has made both prob-
lems worse. The current rise of populism in both the
US and Europe and the vehement reactions to a tide of
migrants from poorer to richer countries show how
these two problems are intertwined.1
In the year 2000, the first author wrote about the chal-
lenge that globalisation and tax competition pose to the
fiscal viability of the post-World War II welfare state.2
He pointed out that if tax evasion by rich individuals
and tax avoidance by multinational corporations is
allowed to undermine the ability of both developed and
developing countries to provide adequate social insur-
ance for their citizens, a violent reaction against globali-
sation may ensue that risks ending this era of opening
borders, just like World War I ended the previous era of
globalisation a century ago. Today we worry that the
lack of adequate response to the Great Recession is lead-
ing to the rise of violent anti-globalisation sentiments on
both the right and the left, embodied in the US by the
success of Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump and in
Europe by an even more virulent rejection of the open
border policies the EU has stood for.3
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gan. The authors would like to thank participants in workshops at NYU
and Duke Law schools for comments, and Itay Peer for invaluable
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1. See, e.g. P. Noonan, ‘Trump, Sanders and the American Rebellion’,
WSJ, 2/11/16; available at: <http:// on. wsj. com/ 1QavpWY>.
2. R. Avi-Yonah, ‘Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of
the Welfare State’, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1573 (2000).
3. Noonan, above n. 1; <www. bbc. com/ news/ world -europe -24583286>.
It is imperative for the West to find ways to strengthen
the ability of the state to provide adequate social insur-
ance and reduce inequality before these forces lead to
the closing of the borders and to pressures that could
result in the end of the current era of globalisation. But
the response so far has unfortunately not been adequate.
Following the financial crisis and ensuing austerity, pol-
iticians discovered the problem of tax avoidance. On the
corporate tax avoidance front, the OECD and G20
launched the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS)
project in 2013, and this has in October 2015 culmina-
ted with the release of a series of action steps that the
OECD and G20 countries have undertaken to adopt.4
OECD Secretary-General Angel Gurria has stated that
Base erosion and profit shifting affects all countries,
not only economically, but also as a matter of trust.
BEPS is depriving countries of precious resources to
jump-start growth, tackle the effects of the global
economic crisis and create more and better opportu-
nities for all. But beyond this, BEPS has been also
4. On BEPS see, e.g., P. Saint-Amans and R. Russo, ‘The BEPS Package:
Promise Kept’, 70 IBFD Bull. Int. Tax. 4 (2016); H.J. Ault, ‘Some Reflec-
tions on the OECD and the Sources of International Tax Principles’.
Reprinted from 70 Tax Notes Int. 12 (2013), at 1195; Working Paper of
the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2013-03.
Available at SSRN: <http:// ssrn. com/ abstract= 2287834> or <http:// dx.
doi. org/ 10. 2139/ ssrn. 2287834>; D. Dharmapala, ‘What Do We Know
about Base Erosion and Profit Shifting? A Review of the Empirical Liter-
ature,’ Illinois Public Law Research Paper No. 14-23; University of Chi-
cago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No.
702 (2014). Available at SSRN: <http:// ssrn. com/ abstract= 2373549> or
<http:// dx. doi. org/ 10. 2139/ ssrn. 2373549>; Y. Brauner, ‘What the
BEPS?’, University of Florida Levin College of Law Research Paper No.
15-40 (2014). Available at SSRN: <http:// ssrn. com/ abstract= 2408034>
or <http:// dx. doi. org/ 10. 2139/ ssrn. 2408034>; H.J. Ault, W. Schoen &
S. Shay, ‘Base Erosion and Profit Shifting: A Roadmap for Reform’, 68
Bull. Int. Tax., 275 (2014); Boston College Law School Legal Studies
Research Paper No. 324. Available at SSRN: <http:// ssrn. com/ abstract=
2459646>; D. Dharmapala, ‘Base Erosion and Profit Shifting: A Simple
Conceptual Framework’, University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute
for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 703 (2014). Available at
SSRN: <http:// ssrn. com/ abstract= 2497770>; R.J. Vann, ‘Policy Forum:
The Policy Underpinnings of the BEPS Project-Preserving the Interna-
tional Corporate Income Tax?’ 62(2) Can. Tax J. 433, at 433-41 (2014);
Sydney Law School Research Paper No. 14/77. Available at SSRN:
<http:// ssrn. com/ abstract= 2483619>; D. Shaviro, ‘The Crossroads ver-
sus the Seesaw: Getting a “Fix” on Recent International Tax Policy
Developments’, NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No.
15-20, NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 15-11 (2015),
Available at SSRN: <http:// ssrn. com/ abstract= 2605144> or <http:// dx.
doi. org/ 10. 2139/ ssrn. 2605144>; A.H. Rosenzweig, ‘Building a Frame-
work for a Post-BEPS World’, 74 Tax Notes Int. No. 12 (2014). Availa-
ble at SSRN: <http:// ssrn. com/ abstract= 2463259>; I. Grinberg, ‘Break-
ing BEPS: The New International Tax Diplomacy’, Georgetown Universi-
ty Law Center Draft (1 September 2015). Available at SSRN: <http://
ssrn. com/ abstract= 2652894> or <http:// dx. doi. org/ 10. 2139/ ssrn.
2652894>.
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eroding the trust of citizens in the fairness of tax sys-
tems worldwide. The measures we are presenting
today represent the most fundamental changes to
international tax rules in almost a century: they will
put an end to double non-taxation, facilitate a better
alignment of taxation with economic activity and val-
ue creation, and when fully implemented, these
measures will render BEPS-inspired tax planning
structures ineffective.5
Is Mr. Gurria justified in his optimism? We do not
think so. These efforts are commendable and to some
extent have an impact. But in our opinion they are inad-
equate. The basic problem is that they take as a given
the fundamental consensus underlying the international
tax regime, also known as the ‘benefits principle’. Under
the benefits principle, active (business) income should
be taxed primarily at source while passive (investment)
income should be taxed primarily at residence.6 This
compromise between the claims of residence and source
countries was reached in 1923 and still serves as the
foundation of the international tax regime.7 It is embed-
ded in over 3,000 bilateral tax treaties and in the domes-
tic laws of the US and most other countries. Not sur-
prisingly, it is also reflected in BEPS, which is an
attempt to improve source-based taxation of active
income.8
In our opinion, the benefits principle should be recon-
sidered, because the reliance on source-based taxation
for active income and residence-based taxation for active
income requires cooperation by too many jurisdictions.
The problems of BEPS stem from its reliance on the
benefits principle.
In the case of active income, the justification for taxation
at source has been that most such income is earned by
corporations that have no fixed residence. However,
since the 1980s, tax competition has led many source
jurisdictions to offer tax holidays to multinationals, and
residence jurisdictions are reluctant to tax their multina-
tional on their global income so as not to put them at a
competitive disadvantage. The result has been that most
multinationals are not taxed currently at source or at
residence.
Two recent examples can be used to illustrate the prob-
lem of tax avoidance on cross-border income:9
As of the end of 2015, US multinationals had over $2
trillion in offshore profits in low-taxed jurisdictions.10
5. OECD, Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, ‘OECD presents out-
puts of OECD.G20 BEPS Project for discussion at G20 Finance Minis-
ters’ meeting, 5 October 2015.
6. On the benefits principle and its origins, see R. Avi-Yonah, ‘The Struc-
ture of International Taxation: A Proposal for Simplification’, 74 Texas
L. Rev. 1301 (1996); R. Avi-Yonah, ‘International Taxation of Electronic
Commerce’, 52 Tax L. Rev. 507 (1997); R. Avi-Yonah, Advanced Intro-
duction to International Tax Law (2015), ch. 1.
7. Avi-Yonah (1996), above n. 6.
8. On the ideas behind BEPS, see, e.g. Ault (2013), above n. 4, at 1195.
9. These examples are based on R. Avi-Yonah, ‘International Tax Evasion
and Avoidance: What Can Be Done?’ The American Prospect (2016).
10. Available at: <http:// ctj. org/ ctjreports/ 2015/ 07/ 21_ trillion_ in_
corporate_ profits_ held_ offshore_ a_ comparison_ of_ international_ tax_
proposals. php#. VroUufkrLmg>.
This amount, which translates to about $700 billion in
US taxes avoided, is mostly income that was economi-
cally earned in the US and shifted offshore to jurisdic-
tions like Singapore, Ireland or Luxembourg, which
have effective tax rates in the single digits.
How do the multinationals do it? A couple of examples
can suffice. Apple, Inc. is the world’s largest company
by market capitalisation. Most of its billions in profits
relate to intellectual property developed at its headquar-
ters in Cupertino, California. But for tax purposes, most
of the profit is booked in its Irish subsidiaries – let’s call
them Apple Ireland.11
Some of the profit shifting is achieved through a ‘cost
sharing agreement’. Cost sharing is a concept developed
in IRS regulations in the 1980s, but which became more
significant due to the increasing importance of intellec-
tual property. The idea behind cost sharing is this:
When a US multinational begins a new research project
(for example, a search for a drug to treat a certain dis-
ease), it can agree to share the costs of development with
its offshore subsidiaries. Then, if the project is success-
ful, the parties share the profits in the same proportions.
For example, if Apple Ireland contributed 80% of the
costs of developing the iPhone 6, it would get 80% of
the profit. Importantly, none of the actual work is done
by Apple Ireland. Apple just gives Apple Ireland the
money and Apple Ireland pays it back as its contribution
to the research costs.
Why would the IRS regulations permit this? Because if
the research failed, then the taxpayer would lose its abil-
ity to deduct the costs sent offshore. The more of the
cost sent offshore, the more deductions would be at risk.
So the IRS thought there was a natural limit to taxpay-
er’s willingness to share costs with offshore affiliates.
That analysis may have been true for Big Pharma,
which usually waits to enter into cost sharing with an
offshore affiliate until a drug has passed its initial trials
and is well on its way to a patent, and then battles the
IRS over valuation issues at the time the cost-sharing
agreement was executed. But the same analysis makes
no sense for Apple, since if there is anything certain in
business, it is that a new version of the iPhone will sell.
There is another trick involved in Apple Ireland’s prof-
itability. Another portion of its profits derive from
countries where Apple sells the iPhones. Apple Ireland
licenses the right to use Apple’s brand and intellectual
property to Apple affiliates in other countries. Those
affiliates in turn pay Apple Ireland hefty royalties,
which operate to shift the sales profits gained in those
countries to Ireland.
Before 1997, such a scheme would not have worked,
because the royalties received by Apple Ireland would
have triggered a tax in the US under so-called Sub-
part F. But in 1997 the Clinton Administration adopted
a rule called ‘check the box’. Under check the box,
Apple Ireland can treat all of its foreign affiliates as if
they did not exist as separate entities for US tax purpo-
11. Available at: <https:// www. gpo. gov/ fdsys/ pkg/ CHRG -113shrg81657/
pdf/ CHRG -113shrg81657. pdf>.
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ses and treat the money they paid to Apple Ireland as
income earned in Ireland. The result is that for US tax
purposes there are no royalties and no US tax triggered
by them, because Apple Ireland treats the money as its
own sales income.
The Obama Administration came in promising to repeal
check the box; this was the biggest international revenue
raiser in the first Obama budget. But by November 2009
the Administration recanted under pressure from the
multinationals. On December 18, 2015, President Oba-
ma signed into law a five-year extension of a provision
(first enacted by a Republican Congress as a ‘temporary’
measure in 2006) that enshrines check the box in the tax
law.
Finally, the Senate hearing revealed two Irish-specific
tricks used by Apple. Ireland has a tax rate of 12.5%, far
below the US rate of 35%. But Apple did not want to
pay even 12.5%. Its solution was ingenious: For US tax
purposes, Apple Ireland is treated as an Irish company
because it is incorporated in Ireland, so it is not taxed by
the US. But for Irish tax purposes, Apple Ireland was
treated as an American company because it is ‘managed
and controlled’ from California. As a result, Apple Ire-
land claimed it was a tax resident nowhere. On top of
that, it negotiated a sweetheart tax deal with Ireland for
its Irish income that resulted in its paying a tax rate of
less than 2%.
These types of tricks are used by most US multination-
als. If the primary driver of value of a US multinational
is intellectual property developed in the US, the Apple
scheme can simply be replicated.
But what if the value derives from more traditional, tan-
gible items? Some US multinationals do pay higher tax-
es (e.g. the car companies). But others try to avoid tax
nevertheless. Caterpillar, Inc. is a good example.12
Caterpillar does not make a lot of money on the heavy
equipment it manufactures. But it makes a bundle on
replacement parts, because once you buy a Caterpillar
bulldozer, you will need parts, which you can obtain
only from Caterpillar at a huge mark-up. Caterpillar
prides itself on its ability to deliver parts within 24
hours anywhere in the world, including the Arctic tun-
dra (where its equipment is used in mineral extraction).
Before 1998, Caterpillar bought the parts from unrela-
ted manufacturers and stored them at its warehouse in
Morton, Illinois. When a dealer requested a part for a
customer overseas, Caterpillar ‘sold’ (but did not actual-
ly ship) the part to a Swiss subsidiary, which in turn
sold the part to the unrelated dealer.
The problem, according to accounting firm PriceWater-
houseCoopers, was that Caterpillar’s sale of the part to
its Swiss subsidiary triggered US tax. Much better,
PwC said, would be if the parts were sold by the manu-
facturer directly to the Swiss subsidiary, which could
then sell it to the dealer.
Fine, said Caterpillar, but we do not want to change our
operations. So in exchange for $60 million in fees, PwC
12. Available at: <www. hsgac. senate. gov/ subcommittees/ investigations/
hearings/ caterpillars -offshore -tax -strategy>.
came up with a way to lower Caterpillar’s US tax with-
out changing its operations. PwC’s solution was for the
manufacturers to bill the Swiss subsidiary for the parts
but continue to ship them to the Illinois warehouse,
which continued to transport them to Caterpillar’s for-
eign customers. If the parts were shipped overseas, they
were deemed to have been ‘owned’ by the Swiss subsid-
iary, and PwC devised a virtual inventory to track them
even though the parts were indistinguishably commin-
gled in the warehouse. The result was that Caterpillar
continued to run its parts business from the US, but
declared 85% or more of the parts profits in Switzer-
land.
The IRS has now challenged this billing arrangement,
which resulted in shifting some $2.4 billion in Caterpil-
lar profits from the United States to Switzerland. A
Grand Jury has issued subpoenas under a criminal
investigation for tax fraud.
But the disturbing fact is that the whole story would not
have come to light but for a whistle-blower, who alerted
both the US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Inves-
tigations and the IRS. And while Caterpillar is facing a
court challenge, in most cases of corporate tax avoid-
ance, like Apple, the IRS’ hands are tied because what
Apple did may have been legal under the US tax code.
The fundamental problem of BEPS stems from its reli-
ance on the benefits principle. BEPS seeks to bolster
source-based taxation of active income, but it does not
apply to countries outside the OECD/G20, and its
scope is quite limited as discussed below.
To preserve the income tax in the 21st century, multi-
lateral solutions are needed. BEPS is multilateral, but it
is hampered by the fact that there are too many source
jurisdictions for active income. If we reversed the bene-
fits principle so that passive income is taxed primarily at
source and active income at residence, far fewer juris-
dictions will need to cooperate.
For passive income, the number of source jurisdictions
is much smaller than residence jurisdictions. Because
most individuals are relatively risk averse, portfolio
investment flows overwhelmingly to a small number of
countries - the US, the EU and Japan. Even the BRICS
mostly attract portfolio investment through mutual
funds that are relatively easy to tax. Thus, if the ‘big
three’ can coordinate to reinstate a withholding tax on
interest, dividends and royalties flowing from them,
most of the problem of taxing passive income can be
solved. Crucially, money cannot stay in tax havens and
earn decent rates of return, so the cooperation of tax
havens is not needed.
For active income, about 90% of large multinationals
are headquartered in the G20, and none of those coun-
tries has a tax rate below 20%, so if they taxed their
multinationals currently on a coordinated basis and
5
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Haiyan Xu doi: 10.5553/ELR.000080 - ELR August 2017 | No. 1
restricted the ability to move out, most of the problem
would be resolved.13
We would therefore suggest that we reconsider the ben-
efits principle in light of the reality of globalisation. We
should tax passive income primarily at source and active
income primarily at residence.
Importantly, like under current rules, this does not pre-
clude the alternative. Once passive income is taxed at
source, taxpayers may be able to credit the tax upon
declaring it to their residence country. And once active
income is taxed at residence, a credit can be given to
source country taxes if the source country responds to
the limitation of tax competition by re-imposing its tax.
But the key is that the income has already been taxed, so
that no double non-taxation ensues even if taxpayers do
not declare the income (in the case of passive income,
where the residence rate may be higher) or source coun-
tries choose not to tax in the case of active income.
The following unpacks this analysis in more detail. Sec-
tion 2 analyses the BEPS response to corporate tax
avoidance and its shortcomings. Section 3 develops the
alternative: Taxing passive income primarily at source
and active income primarily at residence. Section 4 con-
cludes.
2 The Limits of the BEPS
Project
On 5 October 2015, the OECD and G20 released the
final BEPS package of 13 reports, which cover 15
actions.14 It was only two years since the G20 leaders
endorsed the ambitious and comprehensive Action Plan
to address BEPS at the meeting in St. Petersburg on 5-6
September 2013.
The BEPS package represents the first substantial – and
overdue – renovation of the international tax standards
in almost a century.15 The BEPS package is an unprece-
dented turning point in the history of international tax
law. The mission of the BEPS package is to align the
location of taxable profits with the location of economic
activities and value creation. Some generally accepted
principles of international tax law, including the single
tax principle, the benefit principle, the anti-discrimina-
tion principle and the transparency principle have been
reflected in many respects.
Despite considerable progress, there are many short-
comings with the BEPS project due to the short two-
year framework. Hence, the BEPS project is not the
final destination of international tax law reform. In fact,
13. For the location of the world’s 100 largest multinationals, see the For-
bes 2000 list, available at: <www. forbes. com/ sites/ liyanchen/ 2015/ 05/
06/ the -worlds -largest -companies/ #4ebf4ea14fe5> (89% are in G20
countries); for the tax rates of the G20, see <https:// www. flickr. com/
photos/ hmtreasury/ 7003545741>.
14. Available at: <www. oecd. org/ tax/ beps -2015 -final -reports. htm>.
15. OECD, ‘Explanatory Statement’, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit
Shifting Project (2015), at 5.
it is the first step towards the modernisation of global
tax governance in the long run.
2.1 New Shoes on the Old Road: An Old
Approach for the New Destination
The primary problem with the BEPS project is that
although the new destination has been redefined, new
principles and new rules have not been truly established
for the new direction, and the old principles have been
strengthened by a patch up of current rules.
The core principle of international tax law is the single
tax principle, which requires eradication of both double
taxation and double non-taxation.16 Unfortunately, both
the governments and the MNEs have been active in
fighting against the double taxation, and have ignored
another danger of double non-taxation. Therefore, the
main theme of traditional international tax law has been
eradication of double taxation, instead of double non-
taxation.
Based on the single tax principle, the mission of the
BEPS project is to prevent and eliminate the double
non-taxation. As the G20 leaders pointed out the new
principle, ‘profits should be taxed where economic
activities deriving the profits are performed and where
value is created’.17 Therefore, the new direction of
international tax law reform in the context of BEPS
project is to safeguard the single tax principle by fight-
ing against the BEPS.
It is well known that the rickety international tax
regime, including rules and underlying principles, is one
of the primary root causes of BEPS opportunities.18
Therefore, the new direction demands revolutionary
changes to current approaches. The ideal roadmap for
the BEPS project is supposed to replace the old princi-
ples with a new principle, and to redesign the rules
based on the requirement of the new principle.
Unfortunately, many old principles of international tax
law have been preserved and continued in the final
BEPS package. The mixture of new principle and old
principles has substantially compromised the value of
the new principle, and made the legal reform of interna-
tional tax look more like the patch-up of existing rules
and principles. The reason is pretty obvious. On the one
hand, it is impossible to abolish or even reconsider the
dysfunctional current rules, which have been favoured
by some large countries and MNEs. On the other hand,
it is mandatory to change the current rules to some
extent, because of the emerging political pressure
against BEPS schemes.
Given the fact that two years are very short for serious
in-depth research, debate and negotiation, given the
16. Ault (2013), above n. 4; R. Avi-Yonah, ‘Who Invented the Single Tax
Principle? An Essay on the History of US Treaty Policy’, 59 NYLS L. Rev.
305 (2015); R. Avi-Yonah, ‘Full Circle? The Single Tax Principle, BEPS,
and the New US Model’, U of Michigan Public Law Research Paper No.
480 (2015); U of Michigan Law & Econ Research Paper No. 15-019.
Available at SSRN: <http:// ssrn. com/ abstract= 2673463> or <http:// dx.
doi. org/ 10. 2139/ ssrn. 2673463>.
17. Tax Annex to the St Petersburg Declaration, September 2013.
18. Ault (2013), above n. 4. Hugh Ault was the principal theoretical con-
tributor to the BEPS project in his role as senior adviser to OECD.
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strong tradition and interest groups desire to keep the
continuity of old principles, given the global voice for
closing up the BEPS opportunities, the architect of the
BEPS project has no choice but to patch up some loop-
holes of current rules, instead of fundamental restruc-
turing of current regime.19
As a result, complete renovation of current international
tax law did not happen, and genuine new rules guided
by the new principle have not been formulated. More-
over, the patch-up work has produced many more com-
plex, discretionary, uncertain, costly and in many cases
contradictory rules.20 There are two possible negative
consequences. First, it is difficult to translate all the new
rules into the reality. Second, even if the BEPS project
is implemented as outlined and promised in the book, it
is still possible for the creation of either new BEPS
opportunities on the part of MNEs, or arbitrariness on
the part of tax authorities.
In addition to adhering to the independent entity princi-
ple and rejection of the new principle of single unitary
entity, the BEPS project is also silent on the basic con-
cepts of residence and source, and where profit should
be considered to be earned. As the existing rules based
on the old principles have been strengthened, and new
rules based on the new principle have not been estab-
lished, the BEPS project is not so revolutionary and
fundamental as it appears at the first sight.
The ironic fact is that the patch up of current rules in
the BEPS project was made in the name of new mission
and new principle. However, because of the inconsisten-
cies and conflicts between the new principle and old
principles, the new principle of international tax law has
been compromised or undermined by the strengthened
current rules based on old principles. Without the sup-
port of new principle and new rules, it is very challeng-
ing to achieve the new destination of aligning the taxa-
tion of MNE profits with economic activity.
2.2 The Survival and Continuity of Notional and
Illusionary Independent Entity Principle and
Arm’s Length Principle
The traditional international tax law is designed and
interpreted based on the assumption that the various
constituent entities or members of MNE group are
independent of each other and conduct transactions
with each other at arm’s length.21
While criticising the independent entity theory as a fun-
damental flaw of the existing rules, the BEPS Monitor-
ing Group identified a new but implied approach in the
G20 mandate to treat the corporate group of an MNE as
a single firm, and ensure that its tax base is attributed
19. Ault (2013), above n. 4.
20. See detailed discussion below, and the report card prepared by the BEPS
Monitoring Group, available at: <https:// bepsmonitoringgroup.
wordpress. com/ 2015/ 10/ 05/ overall -evaluation/ >.
21. R. Avi-Yonah, ‘The Rise and Fall of Arm’s Length: A Study in the Evolu-
tion of U.S. International Taxation’, 15 Virginia Tax Rev. 89 (1995); R.
Avi-Yonah, ‘Between Formulary Apportionment and the OECD Guide-
lines: A Proposal for Reconciliation’, 2 World Tax J. 3 (2010); R. Avi-
Yonah and I. Benshalom, ‘Formulary Apportionment – Myths and Pros-
pects’, 3 World Tax J. 371 (2011).
according to its real activities in each country.22 This
means that the new destination of taxing MNEs ‘where
economic activities take place and value is created’ is
unlikely to be achieved, without treating the MNE
group as a single firm.
We also support the single unitary entity principle.23 In
our view, the G20 mandate could be interpreted as both
a new direction and a new guiding philosophy, which
requires all the BEPS actions to serve the purpose of
taxing MNEs where economic activities take place and
value is created in the most efficient manner. Guided by
the brand new philosophy, the principle of single uni-
tary entity and the basic concepts of residence and
source need to be established as the cornerstones to sup-
port the design, interpretation and implementation of
new measures in the BEPS package.
Unfortunately, the BEPS project refused to make the
implied principle explicit, but has continued to empha-
sise the independent entity principle, while attempting
to counteract its harmful consequences. Consequently,
the BEPS outputs fail to provide a coherent and com-
prehensive approach, and offer instead proposals for a
patch-up of existing rules, making them even more con-
tradictory and complex.24
According to our observation, virtually all the new rules
of the BEPS package are still built on the notional prin-
ciple of independent entity.25 By its very nature, the
untouchable principle of arm’s length ultimately derives
from the root of independent entity theory. In addition,
many other flawed rules including weak CFC rule; terri-
torial and deferral systems are also indirectly but closely
connected with the independent entity principle.
The orthodoxy of independent entity taxation has two
basic assumptions. First, the members of the MNE
group are regarded as equal, separate and independent
legal persons. Namely, the members of MNE group are
reasonable legal entities. From the perspective of corpo-
rate law, the fiction of independent entity in the context
of a corporate group derives from the orthodoxy of
shareholder’s limited liability and the corporate inde-
pendent status as legal persons in the traditional corpo-
rate law. Second, the contracts between the related par-
ties in the corporate group are freely negotiated at arm’s
length, and the terms of the contract are fair and reason-
able dealings.26 In short, both the entities and the trans-
actions in the corporate group are reasonable, therefore
legal and moral.
22. The BEPS Monitoring Group (BMG), ‘Overall Evaluation of the G20/
OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project’, available at:
<https:// bepsmonitoringgroup. wordpress. com.
23. For a detailed proposal with legislative language, see R. Avi-Yonah, K.
Clausing & A. Durst, ‘Allocating Business Profits for Tax Purposes: A
Proposal to Adopt a Formulary Profit Split’, 9 Fla. Tax Rev. 497 (2009);
R. Avi-Yonah, ‘A Proposal for Unitary Taxation and Formulary Appor-
tionment to Tax Multinational Enterprises’, in P. Dietsch and T. Rixen
(eds.), Global Tax Governance (2016) at 289. We support these pro-
posals, but given the strong opposition of both OECD and the US
Treasury, we regard them as longer-term prospects than the proposal in
this article.
24. The BEPS Monitoring Group, above n. 22.
25. See BEPS Action Plan 8-10.
26. See Avi-Yonah, Clausing & Durst, above n. 23.
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However, the two beautiful and attractive assumptions
do not make sense, and they do not really exist in the
commercial reality. The primary commercial reality is
that a multinational corporate group operates more like
a single, unitary entity or enterprise rather than separate
independent entities or enterprises. This is made possi-
ble by the controlling power of the parent corporation.
As traditional international tax law stubbornly insists on
the old concept of independent entity, the MNEs have
been encouraged to incorporate dozens and even hun-
dreds of affiliates all over the world to undertake aggres-
sive BEPS schemes.27 The more subsidiaries or mem-
bers in the MNE family, the stronger the parent corpo-
ration in reducing the overall transaction cost, and
advance the profitability of the group as a whole. Why?
The answer is very simple. All the commercial activities
of the subsidiaries and affiliates are under the effectively
direct or indirect control from the parent corporation.
Therefore, the profits or benefits could be unlimited by
separate but coordinated operations of business under
the uniform controlling power. On the other hand, the
principle of independent entity could better protect the
MNEs from unlimited risks and liabilities of group
members towards bona fide third parties including the
tax authorities. Therefore, the legal risks and liabilities
of corporate group are limited by law, because there is
no joint and several liability between and among the
group members unless otherwise agreed by the corpo-
rate group members.
Because of the controlling power of the parent corpora-
tion on the top of the pyramid of the complicated corpo-
rate structure, like a smart spider at the centre of a
grand network of corporate groups, it is unlikely to find
real arm’s length transaction in the reality.28 In fact, the
related party contracts within the corporate group are
always concluded without seriously free, competitive
and transparent bargainings and negotiations.
If the BEPS project is designed on the principle of sin-
gle unitary entity, the BEPS counter-measure will be
much more simple and effective, as inter-group transac-
tions will be disregarded, and the profit or tax base will
be attributed to its real activities that generate the profit
and create the value in the jurisdictions.
Unfortunately, many actions of the BEPS project,
including but not confined to Action 2 on hybrid mis-
matches, Action 7 on PE, and Actions 8-10 on transfer-
ring pricing, heavily rely on the legal fictions of inde-
pendent entity and arm’s length transaction.29
2.3 The Survival and Continuity of the
Problematic Benefit Principle
The OECD declared that, the goal of BEPS package is
‘to tackle BEPS structures by comprehensively address-
ing their root causes rather than merely the symptoms.
Once the measures are implemented, many schemes
27. Ibid.
28. For a detailed exposition of the case law demonstrating this repeated
failure, see Avi-Yonah (1995), above n. 21.
29. See BEPS Monitoring Group, above n. 22.
facilitating double non-taxation will be curtailed.’30
Therefore, a key question is whether all root causes,
instead of symptoms, have been addressed?
In our opinion, one of the root causes is traditional ben-
efit principle, which has guided the allocation of global
profits in the past decades, and has created many BEPS
opportunities. Unfortunately, the BEPS project failed in
replacing the benefit principle. Instead, the BEPS pack-
age was still designed based on residence jurisdictions
for passive income and source jurisdictions for active
income.
As articulated in this article, our argument is that BEPS
concerns will be more effectively tackled if passive
income is primarily taxed at source and active income is
primarily taxed at residence. This new philosophy will
help to build a new international tax governance frame-
work of win-win, which will benefit both developed
countries and developing countries. Moreover, the con-
flicts between the domestic demand for tax revenue and
domestic policy to attract foreign direct investment will
be better balanced, and the MNEs and domestic firms
will be offered a level playing field.
Many scholars have realised the significance of the reno-
vation of basic principles of current international tax
law. As Mindy Herzfeld argued,
attempts at coordination cannot be successful unless
there is agreement on an underlying set of principles
for allocating the revenue of global citizens (including
natural persons and legal entities). A more rigorous
effort to develop such a clear and agreed upon set of
principles which rests on economic, philosophic and
fairness grounds is needed.31
2.4 Limited Inclusiveness and Multilateralism
Global challenges need global solutions. BEPS, as a
global concern, is made possible by uncoordinated tax
rules at domestic and international levels. Therefore,
the global solutions need to be based on inclusive and
multilateral global governance. This means each and
every country should be offered equal opportunity and
equal weight to shape the outcome of the global solu-
tions.32
Although OECD/G20 have made great efforts in
organising many non-member countries and NGOs to
participate in the development of the BEPS package, the
inclusiveness and multilateralism of the BEPS project is
limited for a number of reasons.
First, the undisputed fact is that major OECD countries
dominated the formulation of the BEPS package in the
process of discussions and negotiations. As OECD
countries are all developed countries, it is inevitable that
the BEPS project is mainly a result of compromise
between the rich countries. For instance, weak measures
30. OECD, above n. 15, at 5.
31. M. Herzfeld, ‘The Limits of Tax Coordination’, Working Draft (11 Octo-
ber 2015).
32. This does not of course mean that every country will in fact participate,
only that they should be given the opportunity to do so.
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on CFCs, interest deductibility and innovation box
schemes are favoured particularly by the UK.33
Second, although over 60 countries were directly
involved in the process of the BEPS project, they only
account for less than one-third of 193 UN members.34
As MNEs have their taxable presence around the globe,
including the non-participating countries, the effective-
ness of the BEPS project is very limited. The tax com-
petitions between participating countries and non-par-
ticipating countries will continue. The race to the bot-
tom and the unilateral actions taken by any jurisdiction
could hurt all the countries in the world.
Third, although some developing countries were con-
sulted for the BEPS project, it does not necessarily
mean that their core proposals were finally accepted by
the BEPS package. As observed by independent com-
mentators, some key OECD countries opposed and suc-
ceeded in blocking the institutional reform proposal
from developing countries at the 3rd International Con-
ference on ‘Financing for Development’.35
Fourth, less influential participating countries and more
than 120 non-participating counties might be hurt due
to the effect of negative spillover arising from the imple-
mentation of the BEPS project in the future. They are
weak not only because of their limited influence in the
renovation of the current rules, but also because of their
limited experience and resources to enforce the BEPS
actions.
Fifth, the process of public debate and consulting was
relatively insufficient. BEPS Monitoring Group, an
active tax justice advocate, complains that they have
been vastly outnumbered by the army of paid tax advis-
ers and representatives of multinational enterprises.36
Although stakeholder interest, including invaluable
interactions with business and civil society, saw more
than 12,000 pages of comments received on the 23 dis-
cussion drafts published and discussed at 11 public con-
sultations,37 it is unknown to what extent these valuable
proposals have been adopted by the BEPS package.
More importantly, detailed reasons for rejecting differ-
ent proposals have not been published.
Given the fact that it is impossible to guarantee that
countries and stakeholders really had the equal opportu-
nity to influence and shape the outcome of the BEPS
package on really equal footing, OECD and/or G20 is
not the truly global platform for comprehensive reform
of international tax law. To transform the current BEPS
project into truly global, coherent, coordinated and
inclusive actions, the UN should undertake the leader-
ship in the next stage of international tax law reform.
The third paragraph of Article 1 of the Charter of the
UN recognises that the third purpose of the UN is to
achieve international cooperation in solving internation-
al problems of an economic, social, cultural or humani-
tarian character. The fourth paragraph of Article 1 of
33. The BEPS Monitoring Group, above n. 22, at 3.
34. Available at: <www. un. org/ depts/ dhl/ unms/ whatisms. shtml#states>.
35. The BEPS Monitoring Group, above n. 22.
36. Ibid.
37. OECD, above n. 15, at 5.
the Charter of the UN recognises that its fourth purpose
is to ‘be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations
in the attainment of these common ends’.
We believe that the UN will be more qualified, impar-
tial, transparent, credible and influential than the
OECD/G20 in rewriting and renovating the interna-
tional tax rules including the BEPS counter-measures.
All UN members have the right to be heard and repre-
sented in the process of international tax law reform.38
As the working group of the UN, the UN Tax commit-
tee is expected to make great difference in this regard.
We urge that the UN Convention of Anti-BEPS should
be made the cornerstone of the global response to BEPS
in a more coherent, inclusive and multilateral manner.
Compared with the partial multilateral approach of
OEC/G20, the global BEPS actions launched by the
UN will better address the BEPS concerns and restore
the integrity of international tax principles of single tax,
neutrality, transparency and fairness.
3 Reconsidering the
International Tax Regime:
A Multilateral Solution
As stated above, in our opinion it is time to re-evaluate
the benefits principle. Most of the current issues can be
solved if we taxed passive income primarily at source
and active income primarily at residence.
For passive income, the number of source jurisdictions
is much smaller than residence jurisdictions. Because
most individuals are relatively risk averse, portfolio
investment flows overwhelmingly to a small number of
countries – the US, the EU and Japan. If these three
jurisdictions could impose a withholding tax on all out-
bound payments, most of the problem of taxing passive
income could be resolved. Crucially, money cannot stay
in tax havens and earn decent rates of return, so the
cooperation of tax havens in not needed.
In the case of active income, about 90% of large multi-
nationals are headquartered in G20 countries, and none
of those countries has a corporate tax rate below 20%. If
the G20 taxed their multinationals (based on where the
headquarters are located) on a current basis and restric-
ted the ability to move the headquarters, the problem of
taxing active income would be largely resolved as well.
This would take care of the Apple and Caterpillar prob-
lems, because all of their offshore income would be sub-
ject to current US taxation.39
As the first author has argued elsewhere, this multilater-
al approach takes care of the three common critiques of
abolishing deferral of tax on active income. These cri-
tiques are based on economic neutrality, competitive-
38. The UN is based on the principle of sovereign equality of all its mem-
bers. See UN Charter.
39. Some of the BEPS action items (8-10) seek to address the types of profit
shifting engaged in by Apple and Caterpillar, but as argued above they
are not very effective.
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ness and the risk of corporate expatriations. If all our
major competitors are subject to the same regime, this
resolves all three problems.40
But what if the other countries in the G20 are unlikely
to coordinate with the US? In that case, the solution is
‘constructive unilateralism’: unilateral action by the US
that leads to action by other jurisdictions.
The precedent is the adoption of the CFC rules, which
proves (among other examples) that such action can be
both possible and effective in pushing other countries to
adopt similar rules.41
Before 1961, no country taxed the foreign source
income of subsidiaries of its multinationals, because res-
idence countries believed they lacked both source and
residence jurisdiction over foreign source income of for-
eign corporations. However, in 1961 the Kennedy
Administration proposed taxing all income of ‘control-
led foreign corporations’ (CFCs) by using a deemed div-
idend mechanism that was copied from the FPHC
rules.42
While this proposal was rejected, the resulting compro-
mise (Subpart F, 1962) aimed at taxing income of CFCs
that was unlikely to be taxed by source countries either
because it was mobile and could be earned anywhere
(passive income), or because it was structured to be
earned in low-tax jurisdictions (base company income).
Initially, the adoption of Subpart F seemed to have put
US-based multinationals at a competitive disadvantage,
because no other country had such rules. But gradually
this picture changed. The US was followed by Germany
(1972), Canada (1975), Japan (1978), France (1980),
United Kingdom (1984), New Zealand (1988), Australia
(1990), Sweden (1990), Norway (1992), Denmark
(1995), Finland (1995), Indonesia (1995), Portugal
(1995), Spain (1995), Hungary (1997), Mexico (1997),
South Africa (1997), South Korea (1997), Argentina
(1999), Brazil (2000), Italy (2000), Estonia (2000), Israel
(2003), Turkey (2006), and China (2008). Many other
countries, such as India, are considering adopting such
rules. As a result, most of our trading partners now have
CFC rules.
Moreover, the later adopters improved on the US in
two principal ways. First, they rejected the deemed div-
idend mechanism, which can lead to many unforeseen
complications, in favour of taxing the shareholders on a
pass-through basis. Second, they generally explicitly
incorporate the effective foreign tax rate into the deter-
mination whether a CFC will be subject to current tax.
This is better than the US rule that is based solely on
the type of income, because after 1980 it became quite
easy to earn active income that is not subject to tax.43
40. R. Avi-Yonah, ‘Hanging Together: A Multilateral Approach to Taxing
Multinationals’, in T. Pogge and K. Mehta (eds.), Global Tax Fairness,
(2016) at 113.
41. We do not think unilateral action is possible on the evasion front, but as
explained above, coordinated withholding taxes by the US and the EU
should work.
42. R. Avi-Yonah, ‘The Deemed Dividend Problem’, 4 J. Tax. Glob. Trans.
33 (2004), also in Proceedings of the National Tax Assoc. Annual Meet-
ing (2004).
43. See Avi-Yonah (2000), above n. 2.
The result is that the CFCs of EU-based multinationals
are currently generally subject to tax at similar or higher
rates than US-based ones,44 despite the non-taxation of
dividends from active income under territoriality. This
is therefore a classic example of constructive unilateral-
ism. The US led and others followed, and the end result
is that most multinationals are subject to similar effec-
tive tax rates, with no competitive disadvantage or
advantage.45 The result is a world in which there is
much less double non-taxation than in the absence of
CFC rules.
Unfortunately, in the US Subpart F has been critically
undermined by the adoption of check the box and the
CFC to CFC exception, resulting in $2 trillion of low-
taxed accumulated earnings offshore by US multina-
tionals.46 This cannot happen in other countries with
tougher CFC rules, and is a major part of the explana-
tion why despite rampant tax competition most OECD
members did not see the sharp drops in overall corpo-
rate tax revenues that are seen in developing countries.
The main argument in favour of territoriality (i.e.
exempting dividends paid by US CFCs from tax upon
receipt by their parents) is the lock-out problem. About
$2 trillion in low-taxed foreign source income are in
CFCs that cannot repatriate them because of the 35%
tax on repatriations and the absence of foreign tax cred-
its.47 We know this is a real problem because of the
effectiveness of the 2004-2005 amnesty and because of
various attempts by multinationals to avoid the rule (e.g.
via inversions, ‘killer Bs’, short-term loans, etc.).48
But it is less clear that the solution is a participation
exemption. Why not abolish deferral and let the divi-
dends flow back tax-free?
We would argue that this is a good opportunity for ‘con-
structive unilateralism’. No G20 country has a corporate
tax rate below 20%. If the US reduced the corporate tax
to, say, 28%, and at the same time abolished deferral,
the likely response by other G20 members like Germany
or France would be to follow suit.49 They need the extra
revenue more than we do, and concerns about competi-
tiveness would be alleviated by the US move, like they
were in the original CFC context.
It should be remembered that the other G20 have more
effective CFC rules than we do, and those CFC rules
already act as a de facto worldwide system with a mini-
44. See R.S. Avi-Yonah and Y. Lahav, ‘The Effective Tax Rate of the Largest
US and EU Multinationals’ (October 25, 2011), U of Michigan Law &
Econ, Empirical Legal Studies Center Paper No. 11-015; U of Michigan
Public Law Working Paper No. 255. Available at SSRN: <https:// ssrn.
com/ abstract= 1949226> or <http:// dx. doi. org/ 10. 2139/ ssrn.
1949226>.
45. Ibid.
46. K.A. Clausing, ‘The Effect of Profit Shifting on the Corporate Tax Base’,
Tax Notes, 25 January 2016.
47. Ibid.
48. US Senate PSI, <RepatriatingOffshoreFundsReportOct202011wExhi-
bitsFINAL.pdf>.
49. 28% is the rate at which a revenue neutral corporate tax reform can be
achieved if we abolished the three major corporate tax expenditures
(deferral, accelerated depreciation and the domestic manufacturing
deduction). Available at: <https:// www. fas. org/ sgp/ crs/ misc/ R44220.
pdf>.
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mum tax: If the foreign tax is below a set level (e.g. 25%
in Germany or 20% in Japan), the CFC rules kick in to
tax the income. The result is that there is much less lock
out because most low-taxed foreign income is taxed by
the CFC rules. The change to a worldwide system
would be much less radical than usually envisaged. This
is why for both the UK and Japan there was no signifi-
cant increase in repatriations after they adopted territor-
iality in 2009.50
But should the US not adopt a minimum but lower tax
on foreign source income for competitiveness reasons?
This is what both the Obama and Camp proposals
envisage. Obama suggests a 28% corporate tax on
domestic profits and a 19% tax on foreign income, while
Camp proposed a 25% tax on domestic profits and a
12.5-15% tax on foreign income.
The problem, of course, is that such a gap would still
encourage US-based MNEs to shift profits overseas,
with no repatriation tax to deter them. We can always
fall back to such a system if needed. But for now we
would suggest taxing all income at the same rate, and if
that rate has to be lower, so be it. As long as it is above
20% we do not think we will be outside G20 norms, and
a rate in the 20-25% range will not put our MNEs at a
significant competitive disadvantage given the effective
minimum tax imposed by the CFC rules of our trading
partners.
It is impossible to predict what will happen, but the his-
tory described above suggests that there is a good
chance that other G20 countries will follow us if we
abolish deferral at a lower rate.51 And if that happens, all
the usual objections to worldwide taxation (competitive-
ness, inversions and the various neutralities) lose their
force. We do not think there is a significant risk
involved in this move, and the potential upside is quite
large.
4 Conclusion
The benefits principle should be reconsidered in light of
the reality of globalisation. We should tax passive
income primarily at source and active income primarily
at residence. This will enable the large economies to
50. S.E. Shay, J.C. Fleming & R.J. Peroni, ‘Territoriality in Search of Princi-
ples and Revenue: Camp and Enzi’, 141 Tax Notes 173 (2013); 72 Tax
Notes Int. 155 (2013). Available at SSRN: <http:// ssrn. com/ abstract=
2340615>.
51. See the most recent proposal of the EU Commission to tax currently
CFC profits that are subject to an effective tax rate below 40% of the
residence country rate if over 50% of the CFC’s income is either passive
or derived from sales to related parties. Council of the European Union
Doc. 14544/15 (2 December 2015) and Doc.14544/15 Add 1 (2
December 2015), Art. 9. See also EU Commission, ‘Proposal for a
Council Directive laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that
directly affect the functioning of the internal market’, COM (2016) 26
final; EU Commission, ‘Anti Tax Avoidance Package’, COM (2016) 23
final. But see ‘US blasts Brussels over tax probe bias’, Financial Times,
29 January 2016. Hopefully the next US Administration will take a more
cooperative attitude.
address both individual tax evasion and corporate tax
avoidance.
These problems must be addressed if we are to continue
to maintain and expand the benefits of globalisation.
The US public support of globalisation hinges on the
existence of a social insurance safety net. If the rich and
large corporations are not perceived to pay their fair
share, the public’s willingness to pay tax to support this
safety net is eroded. Once a culture of not paying taxes
is established, it is very hard to change. We need to do
something about both tax evasion and avoidance before
it is too late.
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